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The memories of the biggest crimes of the last 
war – Auschwitz, Hiroshima, and Japanese bac-
teriological weapons – did not lose their horri-
fying features with time, as many people could 
have hoped. The burden of the people respon-
sible, and to some extent that of the whole civi-
lised world, has not become less heavy.
The questions of “how” and “why”, instead 
of becoming less important, have been return-
ing again and again to the the minds of a grow-
ing number of people and still remain unan-
swered. How could such crimes happen at all? 
How could people be so cruel towards innocent 
victims, and how was it possible for some victims 
to survive those cruelties? To what extent did the 
crimes of the last war influence their immediate 
victims, and those who were touched only indi-
rectly? In other words, have they influenced the 
ongoing history of individuals and humanity? If 
so, what impact have they made? One does not 
know if these questions will be answered satis-
factorily. Each attempt to answer them touches 
the deepest and the most important problems 
of human life. These problems usually are nev-
er fully explained.
In a sense, the duty of a psychiatrist whose 
area of specialisation is the holistic approach to 
human life is to try, even awkwardly, to answer 
some of those questions. The questions bring 
a new light upon human nature, and in this way 
extend the perspective a psychiatrist uses.
Erich Fromm [1, 2], an American sociologist 
and psychiatrist and one of the founders of the 
so called “cultural school” in psychiatry, believes 
that contemporary civilisation is characterised by 
a contradiction between actuality and abstrac-
tion. The influence of technology makes the en-
vironment emotionally distant for human be-
ings, rendering it detached and unfamiliar. The 
change in battle style that has accompanied 
advances in technology serves as an example. 
While in the past enemies were fighting in di-
rect contact with each other, contemporary war 
technology makes the contact impersonal and 
unemotional. A pilot, who may without emotion 
push a button to kill thousands of people, may 
grieve the death of his pet. To the pilot, the thou-
sands of people are an abstraction, however, the 
beloved dog is an actuality.
The human being perceives the surrounding 
world from the perspective of his or her influ-
ence on it. The nervous system construction it-
self inseparably ties perception with activity. 
A neuron receives information (impulses) from 
its environment through many dendrites and, 
using one channel (axon), sends a command to 
act. The basic physiological unit, a reflex path-
way, is composed of an afferent part and efferent 
part. In such a way, the nervous system structure 
limits a living organism’s cognitive abilities with-
in the frames of its action.
Homo faber forms his or her view of the world 
congruently with a tool he or she uses to con-
quer this world. The world had been perceived 
differently when man had a stone or a club than 
when he/she is using complicated technological 
equipment.
Probably one of the greatest risks of the devel-
opment of technology, besides unquestionable 
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profits, is the technical approach to the whole 
world. In other words, the world is being con-
quered with the scope of machinery. Machin-
ery becomes more important than human be-
ings and becomes a criterion of human achieve-
ments. The surrounding world turns into some-
thing dead, emotionally unmoving, if not hostile. 
One can do anything with the world, according 
to actual needs. The human world is above all 
a social environment, so one approaches it in the 
same manner as one approaches other people 
and the community. A human being is a piece 
of machinery, more or less effective in his/her 
works, and needing a rest or repair from time 
to time. At times, chemical compounds must be 
administered or an operation performed, but 
then the human, or machine, may resume work. 
A community is a complicated piece of machin-
ery, composed of millions of cog-wheels and 
gears (human beings), which can be steered or 
eliminated. Needless to say, this picture of the 
human world, and actually the whole living 
world, is not true.
A human being does not want to be regarded 
as a cog-wheel; his/her sense of freedom (Pavlo-
vian liberty reflex) rebels against it, as well as his/
her need for emotional response. A human be-
ing can not be emotionally dull, as a part of ma-
chinery is; he or she must love and hate, and be 
loved and hated. By accepting the technical ap-
proach to the world one becomes not only alone 
and abandoned, but endangered as well. The 
world seems to be dangerous and hostile.
The feeling of emotional isolation arouses 
a longing for strong attachment, leading to the 
formation of artificial groups which serve any 
paranoiac system. An individual in such a group 
is tied with “eternal” bonds, and sacrifices eve-
rything for the grand “ideas”. A sense of being 
a robot is compensated with the grandiosity of 
an “idea” and the emotional group bonds; with-
out “comrades” one would stay a lonely cog-
wheel, nothing. For that reason, the decompo-
sition of the monolithic unanimity of the group 
leads immediately to group dispersion. The com-
plicated social machinery disarranges into use-
less gears and cogwheels – being artificial is tem-
porary.
In the “machinery community”, any sense 
of responsibility disappears. This responsibili-
ty is obviously essential for normal human de-
velopment. In that type of community, one sub-
ordinates to orders only, becoming a robot, and 
his/her development is arrested at a dwarfed 
human being. Guilt, a normal consequence of 
crimes committed, decreases to null. It is diffi-
cult to feel guilty towards a subject (a gear can-
not be offended), and it is difficult to feel guilty 
while being an automaton blindly fulfilling or-
ders. Nevertheless, the absence of guilt does not 
eliminate responsibility; one remains responsible 
for his/her actions and for becoming a robot.
The problem is not in disavowing guilt of war 
criminals (however it is worth noting that they 
usually notoriously deny any guilt), nor in un-
derstanding the mechanism of war crimes (this 
is a very complicated and still unclear process). 
My aim is to turn attention to the risk of criminal 
behaviour, which is often inconsiderate, hidden 
within the technical approach to human beings 
and community. The technical approach to the 
world should not, of course, be confused with 
technological progress. The first may be danger-
ous, the latter – profitable.
In his book, Adolf Gawalewicz [3] says that 
only a few succeeded in escaping from “the wait-
ing room to the gas chamber” (Auschwitz Block 
VII). The prisoners believed in “impossible, in-
credible things”, meaning “they would get out, 
against all obstacles”. It is obvious the belief itself 
was not enough, one had to mobilize oneself to 
act within the real limits of possibility – as min-
imal and hopeless as they were – to influence 
one’s behaviour. One had to be an “active mus-
lim”. The author brings up a significant example 
showing the importance of the words “I want” 
for survival in the concentration camp. “Who 
thought another way, did not live. One night 
one of my colleagues, still in very good physical 
condition, confessed to me: I am fed up, this all 
is hopeless, and I do not want to live any long-
er. A couple of hours later we took his corpse out 
from the block.”
One should not forget that not so long ago, be-
fore World War II, the majority of psychiatrists 
and psychologists were of the opinion that free 
will did not exist. However, in a situation of max-
imal slavery and complete disregard of human 
dignity and ability to make a choice, the will to 
survive appeared to be decisive for survival.
It may seem paradoxical, but those who were 
in a terminal situation could say “I want” or “I do 
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not want”, while their perpetrators, who were in 
an incomparable better physical and moral sit-
uation, could not. In a concentration camp, the 
true living people were those put on the verge of 
death, while those who had death signs on their 
caps were not living people, but robots.
In spite of the abundance of literature on con-
centration camps, one who has not lived through 
the ordeal of the camp cannot envision how it 
was. Days and nights were filled with suffering 
beyond the limits of human imagination. How-
ever, the issue has been approached by even the 
best writers. Zofia Nałkowska, a member of the 
International Commission for Nazi Crimes Stud-
ying, visited the sites of concentration camps and 
mass murders, talked with survivors and wit-
nesses, and composed her impressions in “Me-
dialiony”[4]. The book has been regarded as an 
excellent, shocking, and synthesizing document 
of Nazi crimes, therefore playing a specific role 
in concentration camp literature. She realized 
that “what people went through [in Nazi con-
centration camps and prisons] could not be ex-
pressed in words”. Somebody trying to grasp the 
immense size of these crimes finds it difficult to 
get to them at all. In “Medaliony”, Nałkowska 
wrote: “Reality can be lived through, as not all is 
given in experience, or not all at the same time. It 
comes to us in fragments of events, scraps of re-
alization. Our thinking of it is an attempt to bring 
it together, immobilize it and understand”.
That was a different world, as different from 
ours as the world of the psychotic person. Upon 
entering concentration camps, prisoners often 
experienced an acute derealisation state; what 
they were seeing seemed unreal, like a terrify-
ing nightmare. The difference between what 
they saw and the ordinary human world was 
enourmous. “I thought: all this cannot be true, it 
is a dream fantasy...” recollects Gawalewicz [3].
A psychosis, especially the schizophrenic 
type, leaves a mark; a person is changed. Sim-
ilarly, people who went through the concentra-
tion camp became different people. In actuality, 
they found it difficult to adapt to normal, ordi-
nary life afterward. The way they assessed oth-
er people had changed, at least for some time, as 
well as their hierarchy of values, life goals, and 
even personality. On the other hand, the con-
centration camp was a kind of test of their en-
durance. Within every person, there is a heroic 
portion, a need to check oneself: how much can 
I withstand, what are my abilities? Perhaps this 
is the reason why young boys go through tests of 
endurance in so called “primitive” cultures. They 
are recognized as adult men only after complet-
ing these tests. Those who survived the concen-
tration camp had stood its trial. Maybe this is the 
reason for their alienation from other people and 
longing for a group of other survivors, as only 
they are capable of understanding.
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